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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Following the traditional analysis, as exemplified by Roche and Will v.
United States, the Supreme Court seemed to be saying that "clear abuse of
discretion" is not the correct standard for determining whether mandamus
should issue. Rather, the proponent of mandamus must show an abuse of
indiscretion: in other words, an order by a trial judge which he had no dis-
cretion to enter. In the case of this kind of order-for example, a trial court's
violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in granting a new trial-it
could be argued that the trial court was acting outside its power, and thus
the traditional standard would be satisfied.
In addition, the Supreme Court emphasized that mandamus in this case
violated the strong Congressional policy opposing "piecemeal review," and
stated that Daiflon had an adequate means of relief through the normal
appellate process.24 The Court thus implied that the inconvenience to
Daiflon of a new trial, without more, would not constitute a harm great
enough to justify circumvention of the normal appellate process. 25
Justices Blackmun and White dissented from the per curiam opinion, ex-
pressing dissatisfaction with the majority's peremptory handling of the
case.
26
The Daifon case is part of the Court's general trend toward restricting
opportunities for interlocutory review.2 7 The court is apparently proceeding
from the premise that piecemeal review wastes judicial resources. Though
the Court's decision in Daiflon was correct under traditional mandamus anal-
ysis, perhaps it should more closely examine whether, in this kind of case,
judicial resources can better be conserved by allowing interlocutory review
to avoid the repetition of lengthy jury trials in complex cases.
Neal Richardson
II. COMMUNITY COMMUNICA TIONS Co. v CITY OF BOULDER-REVERSED
In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,28 the United States
Supreme Court reversed a Tenth Circuit decision 29 in which the court of
appeals had declared that the City of Boulder was immune from antitrust
liability under the Sherman Act.30
In 1964, the Boulder City Council granted Community Communica-
tion Company's (CCC) predecessor a twenty-year, revocable, nonexclusive
permit to operate a cable television business in the city. The permit was
24. Id.
25. Cf. 612 F.2d at 1254.
26. 449 U.S. at 37.
27. Set Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), restricting the application of
the "death knell" doctrine.
28. 50 U.S.L.W. 4144 (1982). Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, joined by Jus-
tices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens. Justice Stevens filed a special concurrence, and
Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor. Justice
White did not participate.
29. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
1982]
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
assigned to CCC in 1966. Since then CCC has provided cable television
service to the University Hill area of the city, an area where approximately
twenty percent of the city's residents live and where for geographic reasons
broadcast television signals cannot be received well. Because of limited tech-
nology, CCC's service was restricted to the retransmission of Denver and
Cheyenne broadcasts. When improved technology enabled CCC to offer
substantially more entertainment than could be provided by local broadcast
television, CCC informed the city council that it planned to expand into
other areas of the city. At approximately the same time, newly formed Boul-
der Communications Company informed the council of its interest in ob-
taining a permit to provide competing cable service in the city. 3'
The city council responded by enacting an emergency ordinance
prohibiting CCC from expanding its business into other areas of the city for
three months. The city planned during the moratorium to draft a model
cable television ordinance and to invite new businesses to enter the Boulder
market. The purpose of the moratorium was to prevent the expansion of
CCC during the drafting of the model ordinance because it was feared that
such expansion would discourage potential competitors from entering the
market. 32 When the CCC continued building, city authorities arrested
CCC's construction crews and tore down its cables.
33
CCC filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado seeking a preliminary injunction and alleging that the city's re-
striction on CCC's expansion was a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 34 The district court held that the state action exemption of Parker v.
Brown35 was not available to Boulder, and therefore the city was subject to
antitrust liability. 36 The city appealed, and a divided panel of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the city was immune
from antitrust liability under Parker.37
31. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4144-45.
32. Id. at 4145.
33. 630 F.2d at 710 (Markey, C.J., dissenting) (sitting by designation).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). This section states that "[elvery contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States . . . is declared to be illegal."
35. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
36. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo.
1980).
37. 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980). For a thorough discussion of the proceedings in the
lower courts and a discussion of the state action exemption, see Antitrust, Seventh Annual Tenth
Circuit Survey, 58 DEN. L.J. 249 (1981). See also Kennedy, Of Lawyers, Lighibuihs and Raisins: An
Analysis of te State Action DoctrIne under the Antitrust Laws, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 31 (1979).
During the pendency of this appeal, Boulder decided on a districting plan whereby more
than one cable company will be operating in Boulder. The district court granted CCC another
preliminary injunction against what had become for CCC a permanent geographic limitation.
The district court granted the injunction on both Sherman Act and first amendment grounds.
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 496 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1980). The
court of appeals held that to the extent the lower court grounded its order on the Sherman Act,
it erred because of the Tenth Circuit's earlier opinion. Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, No. 80-1882, slip op. at 9 (10th Cir. Sept. 22, 1981). The court of appeals
reversed on the first amendment claim, holding that the district court erred in summarily apply-
ing the first amendment principles governing newspapers to cable operators. Id. at 15. The
appellate court remanded to the district court for a determination of whether cable television's
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The question facing the Supreme Court in Community Communica-
tions' appeal from the Tenth Circuit decision was whether Boulder was im-
mune from liability under Parker and its progeny. In Parker, the Supreme
Court was called upon to determine the validity of a program adopted by
the State of California that sought to restrict competition in the state's raisin
industry and prevented raisin producers from freely distributing their raisins
through private channels. 38 The Parker Court held that the program was
exempt from the antitrust laws, stating:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its his-
tory which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its
officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a
dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attrib-
uted to Congress. 39
For over three decades the Supreme Court did not elaborate on its view
of state immunity from antitrust liability. Then, in 1975, in Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar40 the Court struck down a minimum fee schedule established
by the Fairfax County Bar Association. The Court held that the threshold
requirement for establishing antitrust immunity under Parker is that the ac-
tivity must be required by the state in its sovereign capacity; immunity is
permitted only if the action was in fact compelled, rather than merely au-
thorized, by the state.41 Because the State of Virginia did not require mini-
mum fee schedules, the bar association enjoyed no immunity.
The following year, the Supreme Court was again faced with a state
action question. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. ,42 the Court held that a public
utility's policy of dispensing free light bulbs to consumers of electricity was
subject to the antitrust laws. The Court stated that, in the absence of a state
policy regarding the regulation of the distribution of light bulbs, approval by
the Michigan Public Service Commission of the tariffs containing the distri-
bution was not a sufficient basis for immunity.4 3
In Bates v. State Bar of Ari ona,4 4 the Supreme Court for the first time
since Parker granted a defendant immunity on state action grounds. At issue
was a state disciplinary rule prohibiting advertising by lawyers. Because the
rule was an "affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court,' 45 and
because the Arizona Supreme Court was given authority to govern the legal
profession by the state constitution, the court sustained the State Bar's claim
of immunity.
"unique attributes" warrant, under the first amendment, the type of regulation the city seeks to
impose. Id. at 24.
38. 317 U.S. at 344-48.
39. Id. at 350-51.
40. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
41. Id. at 790.
42. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
43. Id. at 598.
44. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
45. Id. at 360.
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In 1978, the Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the Parker
doctrine to municipalities. In City of Lafayette V. Louisiana Power &Light Co. ,46
the Court rejected the proposition that cities were automatically entitled to
the Parker exemption. The issue in the case was whether two Louisiana cit-
ies, which owned and operated electric utility systems, could be held liable
under the Sherman Act for offenses allegedly committed in the conduct of
their utility systems. A plurality applied a test for immunity based upon the
authorization by the state of the challenged conduct. According to the plu-
rality, municipal conduct is shielded from the antitrust laws if the conduct is
engaged in "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation
or monopoly public service."'47 This state policy must be "clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed."'48 The plurality opinion stated:
Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the fed-
eral deference of the States that create them. Parker's limitation of
the exemption to "official action directed by a state" is consistent
with the fact that the States' subdivisions generally have not been
treated as equivalents of the States themselves. In light of the seri-
ous economic dislocation which could result if cities were free to
place their own parochial interests above the Nation's economic
goals reflected in the antitrust laws, we are especially unwilling to
presume that Congress intended to exclude anticompetitive munic-
ipal action from their reach.4 9
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment on the basis that the anti-
trust laws should reach municipal action when the city is acting in a proprie-
tary capacity, but not when it is acting in its governmental capacity.
Because the City of Lafayette was engaged in the business of a public utility,
the Chief Justice would not allow them an exemption.5 0
In Community Communi ations, the Court held that Boulder's moratorium
could not be exempt from the antitrust laws unless it constituted either the
action of the State of Colorado or municipal action in furtherance of "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. 15 ' Boulder argued that
these conditions were met because of its status as a home rule city.52 Because
home rule cities in Colorado have "every power theretofore possessed by the
legislature . . . in local and municipal affairs,"153 Boulder argued that its
46. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). Seegenerall Kletzke, Antitrust Liability ofMuni'pal Corporatons. The
Per Se Rules vs. The Rule of Reason-A Reasonable Compromise, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253; Rogers,
Municipal Antitrtst Liabiliy in a Federalist System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305; Rose, Municipal Antitrst
Liability, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 245.
47. 435 U.S. at 413.
48. Id. at 410. A majority of the Court later adopted this test in California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
49. Id. at 412-13 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 422.
51. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4146-47.
52. Id. at 4147. The Colorado Home Rule Amendment gives cities and towns having a
population of two thousand inhabitants the power to enact ordinances relating to local matters
which "supersede within territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of
the state in conflict therewith." CoLO. CONST. art. xx, § 6.
53. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147 (quoting Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne, 618 P.2d
1374, 1381 (Colo. 1980), quoting Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 294, 369 P.2d 67, 72 (1962) (emphasis in original)).
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ordinance was an act of government performed by the city acting as the state
in local matters.5 4 The Court rejected this argument, stating that the city
misconceived both the letter and the spirit of the law. The Court stated that
"[o]urs is a 'dual system of government,' which has no place for sovereign
cities," 55 and quoted the dissent in the court of appeals as stating "[wie are a
nation not of 'city-states' but of States."'56
The Court couched its opinion in terms of legislative intent, stating that
[w]hen Parker examined Congress' intentions in enacting the anti-
trust laws, the opinion noted that 'nothing in the language of the
Sherman Act or in its history. . . suggests that its purpose was to
restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature . . . . [And] an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's
control over its ofjiers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Con-
gress.' Thus Parker recognized Congress' intention to limit the state
action exemption based upon the federalism principle of limited
state sovereignty.
57
The Court's argument is misleading in two respects. First, it suggests that
Congress, when it passed the Sherman Act, intended to exempt state, but not
municipal, action. Given the extremely narrow definition of "interstate
commerce" at the turn of the century, 58 it is more likely that it never oc-
curred to Congress that the Act might one day be applied to government
action. Second, the majority opinion suggests that the Parker Court intended
to exclude municipal action from the exemption it created. That message
from the Parker opinion is not as clear as the majority implies. The Parker
Court stated, in examining the legislative history of the Act, that "[tihe spon-
sor of the bill . .. declared that it prevented only 'business combina-
tions.' 59 The Parker Court continued, stating that the purpose of the
Sherman Act "was to suppress combinations to restrain competition and at-
tempts to monopolize by btdividuals and corporations ,"6 and "we have no ques-
tion of the state or its munic'pality becoming a participant in a private
agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade .... ",61 The
Parker opinion simply does not support the conclusion that the Parker Court
intended to limit the scope of the exclusion.
The City of Boulder also argued that the ordinance constituted action
undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy, contending that by virtue of the Colorado Home Rule Amend-
54. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the ordinance fell within the scope of the
power delegated to the city by virtue of the Colorado Home Rule Amendment, that is, that the
regulation of cable television is a local matter. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147 n. 16.
55. Id. (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 351) (emphasis added by Community Communica-
tions Court).
56. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147 (quoting Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d at
717 (Markey, CJ., dissenting)).
57. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147 (emphasis added by Community Communications Court) (citations
omitted).
58. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1896) (sugar trust not engaged
in interstate commerce).
59. 317 U.S. at 351 (citing Cong. Rec. 2562, 2457).
60. 317 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added).
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ment's guarantee of local autonomy Colorado has granted to Boulder the
power to enact the moratorium ordinance and that the legislature contem-
plated the kind of action complained of. 6 2 The Court held, however, that
the requirement of "clear articulation and affirmative expression" is not sat-
isfied by neutrality on the part of the state, stating that acceptance of the
proposition that a general grant of power to enact ordinances constitutes
state authorization to enact anticompetitive ordinances would "wholly evis-
cerate" the concepts of "clear articulation and affirmative expression" re-
quired by the Court's earlier precedents. 63
The Court went on to say that the mere finding that the Parker exemp-
tion was not available to the city did not mean that the same antitrust rules
that now apply to private persons would apply to cities. The Court stated
that "[i]t may be that certain activities, which might appear anticompetitive
when engaged in by private parties, take on a different complexion when
adopted by a local government. '"64
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Rehnquist described the majority's deci-
sion as a "novel and egregious error"65 and expressed concern that it would
"impede, if not paralyze" 66 the efforts of local governments to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare.
The dissent argued that the majority erred in characterizing the Parker
decision as one involving exemption from the Sherman Act, arguing instead
that it involved preemption. Because the presumptions utilized in exemption
analysis are quite different from those used in preemption analysis, the dis-
sent argued that failure to distinguish between the two led the Court to the
wrong conclusion. According to Justice Rehnquist, preemption analysis in-
volves "the interplay between the enactments of two different sovereigns-
one federal and the other state."'6 7 Under the supremacy clause, 68 when
there is a conflict between the laws of the federal government and those of a
state or local government, 69 or where the federal government has occupied a
field exclusively, the state or local enactment must fall. Because of federal-
ism concerns, there is a presumption against preemption that can be over-
come only by a clear manifestation by Congress of an intention that the
federal act should supersede the police powers of the state.70
Justice Rehnquist argued that exemption, on the other hand, does not
involve the interplay of enactments of different jurisdictions, but rather the
interplay of enactments of a single sovereign. The question under exemption
62. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147.
63. Id. at 4147-48.
64. Id. at 4148 n.20.
65. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4152 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 4149.
67. Id. (quoting Handler, Antitnst - 1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1379 (1978)).
68. U.S. CONST. art vi, cl. 2, states in pertinent part:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land ....
69. The Supreme Court has never made a distinction between states and their subdivisions
with regard to the preemptive effects of federal law. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4151 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
70. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4149 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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analysis is whether one law was intended to relieve a party from the necessity
of complying with a prior enactment, and the presumption is that there was
no such intent.7 '
The dissent predicted a number of problems to be encountered in the
future due to the majority's application of the antitrust laws to municipali-
ties. These problems include a determination of whether the per se rules of
illegality 72 will apply to municipal defendants in the same manner as they
are applied to private defendants, and whether cities will be liable for treble
damages for enacting anticompetitive ordinances.7 3 The major problem
foreseen by the dissent, however, is the application of the "rule of reason" to
municipalities. Under the rule of reason, as applied to private defendants,
restraints may be defended only on the basis that the restraint has no unrea-
sonable effect on competition or that its pro-competitive effects outweigh its
anticompetitive effects. 74 For example, in National Society of Professi'onal Engi-
neers o. United Slates,75 which dealt with a provision in the Society's ethical
code prohibiting competitive bidding, the Court held that an anticompeti-
tive restraint could not be defended on the basis of a private party's conclu-
sion that competition is itself unreasonable. The Communit Communt'at'ons
dissent questioned whether the same rule would apply to municipalities, that
is, whether municipalities would be foreclosed from arguing that the benefits
to the health, safety, and public welfare outweigh the anticompetitive effects
of the ordinance. Justice Rehnquist stated that "[i]f municipalities are per-
mitted only to enact ordinances that are consistent with the pro-competitive
policies of the Sherman Act, a municipality's power to regulate the economy
would be all but destroyed."
76
On the other hand, he argued, if the rule of reason were modified to
permit a municipality to defend its regulation on the ground that its benefits
to the community outweigh its anticompetitive effects, the Court would be
called upon to engage in the same wide-ranging, standardless inquiry into
local regulation that it did during the Lochner era.77
If the problem were analyzed as one of preemption rather than one of
exemption, argued the dissent, these problems would be avoided. 78 Instead
of a sweeping review by federal courts, the courts would be confronted with
the simpler question of whether the ordinance enacted is preempted by the
Sherman Act. Moreover, because a municipality does not violate the anti-
trust laws when it enacts legislation preempted by the Sherman Act, deter-
71. Id.
72. Under the per se rules, some kinds of conduct are considered unreasonable as a matter
of law, and there will be no inquiry into their reasonableness. United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing).
73. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . ..shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
74. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
75. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
76. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4151 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
77. During the "Lochner era," the Supreme Court invalidated a great amount of social and
economic legislation on the ground that it violated the due process clause. See, e.g., Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
78. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4151 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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mining the remedy is not a problem-the preempted legislation is simply
invalid and unenforceable.
Finally, the dissent warned that the majority's decision effectively de-
stroys the "home rule movement," through which local governments have
garnered some autonomy over matters of local concern. 79 The impact of this
decision will be felt most by those municipalities having the greatest auton-
omy because they will be least able to avail themselves of the protective
mantle of the state.
The impact of this case is far from certain, and the resolution of the
problems forecasted by the dissent will not be simple. Perhaps a better reso-
lution of the case would have been to adopt the preemption analysis of the
dissent in Community Communications and Chief Justice Burger's concurrence
in City of Lafayette, in which he argued for a distinction between proprietary
and governmental functions.8 0 Under this analysis, municipal activity is not
subject to the antitrust laws if the activity is governmental and not pre-
empted; municipal activity is subject to the antitrust laws if the municipality
is engaging in proprietary activity or governmental activity that is
preempted.
Local governments should not be hamstrung in their ability to protect
the health, safety, and public welfare of their citizens; nor should they, when
engaging in a proprietary activity, be permitted to avail themselves of an
"exemption" from the antitrust laws, thereby putting themselves in a posi-
tion superior to that of their private competitors. In the absence of a clear
manifestation by Congress of an intent to preempt local government action,
such action should not be subject to the antitrust laws.
Kingsly R. Browne
III. MITCHELL v D.R. -VACATED AND REMANDED
In Mitchellv. D.R. ,81 the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for fur-
ther consideration in light of Harris v. McRae8 2 and Williams v. Zbaraz,8 3 the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in D.R. v. Mitchell.8 4 The court
had held that a Utah statute,8 5 which prohibited the expenditure of public
assistance funds for abortions except where the operation was necessary to
79. Id. at 4152.
80. Admittedly, this is not always a clear distinction. For example, in the Tenth Circuit's
Commumni Communziations decision, the majority felt that the regulation of cable television was
an exercise of governmental authority, 630 F.2d at 707, while the dissent claimed that the ordi-
nances are, "in fact and intent," contracts, reflecting a proprietary interest. 630 F.2d at 719
(Markey, CJ., dissenting). The city was not, however, engaging in the operation of a cable televi-
sion business, in which case it would be involved in proprietary activity; instead, it was involved
in the regulaiton of the cable television business, a governmental activity.
81. 449 U.S. 808 (1980).
82. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
83. 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
84. 617 F.2d 203 (10th Cir. 1980).
85. Utah Code Ann. § 55-15a-3 (Supp. 1979).
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